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Searching for “Superchief” and Other Fictional Indians: A Narrative and Case 
Comment on R v Bernard 
Abstract 
In R v Bernard, 2017 NBCA 48, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts’ reasoning that 
a Mìgmaw man living in the traditional Mìgmaq hunting territory of St. John, New Brunswick could not 
exercise his Aboriginal rights to hunt because he could not prove he descended from the particular 
subgroup of Mìgmaq who were at St. John at the time of contact with Europeans. In deciding so, the 
Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the Mìgmaq, as a nation, are the appropriate rights holders 
and ought to be the body deciding who can exercise the Mìgmaw right to hunt in the province. This 
argument was rejected based on the evidence of an expert historian who testified that Mìgmaq could not 
be a “nation” because they had a decentralized form of government and lacked a “Super Chief.” The case 
also exhibits undertones of floodgate fears of over-hunting as a consequence of finding the Mìgmaq 
nation to be the right-holders. This, however, ignores the role Mìgmaq laws and protocols will play in 
responsibly regulating Mìgmaq hunting and avoiding overuse of resources (not to mention the Crown’s 
ability to address conservation issues through the Sparrow justification framework). This article tells the 
story of the Bernard case and provides critical commentary on it. 
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In R v Bernard, 2017 NBCA 48, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts’ 
reasoning that a Mìgmaw man living in the traditional Mìgmaq hunting territory of St. John, 
New Brunswick could not exercise his Aboriginal rights to hunt because he could not prove 
he descended from the particular subgroup of Mìgmaq who were at St. John at the time of 
contact with Europeans. In deciding so, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the 
Mìgmaq, as a nation, are the appropriate rights holders and ought to be the body deciding 
who can exercise the Mìgmaw right to hunt in the province. This argument was rejected 
based on the evidence of an expert historian who testified that Mìgmaq could not be a 
“nation” because they had a decentralized form of government and lacked a “Super Chief.” 
The case also exhibits undertones of floodgate fears of over-hunting as a consequence of 
finding the Mìgmaq nation to be the right-holders. This, however, ignores the role Mìgmaq 
laws and protocols will play in responsibly regulating Mìgmaq hunting and avoiding overuse 
of resources (not to mention the Crown’s ability to address conservation issues through the 
Sparrow justification framework). This article tells the story of the Bernard case and provides 
critical commentary on it. 
* Naiomi Sara Walqwan Metallic, a Mìgmaw woman from the Listuguj First Nation, is an 
Assistant Professor and Chancellor’s Chair in Aboriginal Law and Policy at the Schulich 
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FIGURE 1: “SUPER-CHIEF” 
SOURCE: Panel from All Star Western, vol #119, published July 1961 by DC Comics.1 
NOTE: “Super-Chief ” is the name of several fctional characters, including three
superheroes and one supervillain in the DC Comics universe. 
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MY CONTRIBUTION TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE is the story of Stephen Bernard’s 
hunting rights case before the New Brunswick courts.2 I acted as counsel for Mr. 
Bernard before the New Brunswick Court of Appeal.3 Mr. Bernard is a Mìgmaw4 
man from Saint John, New Brunswick, who fought a 12-year legal battle 
mounting an Aboriginal rights defence to the charge of hunting deer for food 
without a licence. In order to win, Mr. Bernard had to meet the Aboriginal rights 
test set out in R v Van der Peet.5 Tis test requires the Aboriginal claimant to prove 
that the activity they engaged in was an element of a pre-contact practice, custom, 
or tradition that could be characterized as “integral to the distinctive culture of 
the Aboriginal group claiming the right.” 6 Despite meeting all the elements of 
this onerous test, Mr. Bernard nonetheless lost. Te reason? He could not prove 
that he descended from the particular sub-group of Mìgmaq who were in the 
Saint John area pre-contact (circa sixteen hundreds) and quit the area about a 
hundred years later for reasons unknown (probably colonial displacement), likely 
then joining other Mìgmaq elsewhere. 
Te lower courts who heard the case insisted that Mr. Bernard had to prove 
his connection to this particular sub-group of Mìgmaq and not the Mìgmaq 
people/nation more generally. Unfortunately, the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal upheld the lower courts’ reasoning, despite arguments that this sub-group 
approach to Mìgmaq rights-holders is not only inconsistent with Mìgmaq 
socio-political organization, but also not in keeping with Supreme Court of 
Canada (SCC) jurisprudence and the purpose of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, as well as meaningful reconciliation. It is this novel sub-group requirement 
(I refer to it below as the “community-continuity requirement” or the “CCR”) 
and its numerous problematic implications for the Mìgmaq nation that is the 
focus of this case comment. 
My narrative of the Bernard appeal starts with unpacking problems with the 
community-continuity requirement from a Mìgmaq perspective. Following this, 
I attempt to humanize this case by talking about the Mìgmaw man at the center 
2. See R v Bernard, 2010 NBPC 30 [Bernard NBPC], af’d 2016 NBQB 21 [Bernard NBQB], 
af’d 2017 NBCA 48 [Bernard NBCA]. 
3. I am writing this article with the full knowledge and consent of Stephen Bernard. 
4. I am using the Metallic Orthography spelling of Mìgmaq except where another orthography 
appears in a quoted source. In this article, “Mìgmaq” is used to refer to the people; 
“Mìgmaw” to refer to a singular person. For more on the Metallic Orthography, see 
Emmanuel N Metallic, Danielle E Cyr & Alexandre Sévigny, Te Metallic Mìgmaq-English 
Reference Dictionary (Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2005). 
5. [1996] 2 SCR 507 [Van der Peet]. 
6. Ibid at para 46. 











of it, Stephen Bernard, and how the case has afected him. Next, I review the 
fawed reasoning in the lower courts and how we responded to this on appeal. 
Te New Brunswick Court of Appeal’s endorsement of this fawed reasoning is 
then discussed. Finally, I end with some refections on the case, particularly its 
piecemeal, community-by-community approach to proving rights-holders. 
I. THE PROBLEM WITH THE COMMUNITY-CONTINUITY 
REQUIREMENT (“CCR”) 
By adding the CCR to the Aboriginal rights test, the New Brunswick courts 
efectively turned the specifc collectivity of Mìgmaq at Saint John into its own 
distinct nation separate from all other Mìgmaq. Accordingly, in order to win, Mr. 
Bernard had to prove how this specifc community survived as a distinct group 
living in Saint John up to contemporary times and that he was a member of this 
distinct community. In the absence of a present-day “Mi’kmaq reserve in or near 
Saint John and no organized Mi’kmaq group here [in Saint John],” Mr. Bernard 
failed to prove these things and lost his case.7 
Te fact that Mr. Bernard was a status Indian under the Indian Act, RSC 1985 
c I-5 and a member of the Sipekne’katik First Nation (a Mìgmaq community in 
Nova Scotia) did not help him. In fact, his membership in the Sipekne’katik First 
Nation worked against him. It was construed to mean that Mr. Bernard could 
not be a member of the rights-holding Saint John Mìgmaq community, even 
though he and his extended family lived their entire lives in Saint John going 
back four generations. Te reasoning of the courts in R v Bernard efectively 
transforms a small sub-group of Mìgmaq (who are assumed by the courts to 
be a cohesive and complete unit) into an independent Indigenous “nation,” 
unconnected from the larger cultural, linguistic, and political group (peoples) of 
which they form part. On this logic, because the fctional “Saint John Mìgmaq 
community” (read “nation”) had left the area at some point after contact, they 
were taken to have “abandoned their rights,” and no other Mìgmaq could exercise 
their hunting rights.8 
Te courts’ CCR was infuenced in large measure by the Crown’s position 
that the Mìgmaq nation itself could not be the proper rights-holder, since 
Mìgmaq socio-political organization had historically been decentralized and 
lacked an overarching decision-making body or leader. In his oral submissions 
7. Bernard NBPC, supra note 2 at para 109. 
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to the Court of Appeal, the Crown counsel repeatedly emphasized the Mìgmaq 
peoples “lacked a Superchief.” 
In taking this position, the Crown relied on the evidence of its expert witness, 
Doctor Stephen Patterson, who relied on the fact that the seventeenth century 
Peace and Friendship Treaties were signed with smaller collectives of Mìgmaq 
(rather than the nation as a whole) to support the theory that Mìgmaq could 
not be a true “nation,” because they were decentralized and lacked a hierarchical 
government with a supreme leader. In particular, the Crown highlighted the 
following passage of his testimony in its written submissions:9 
Te treaties are with the people who lived there in the 18th century, same with all of 
the other groups. It came to the British eventually that you couldn’t sign a treaty with 
the Mi’kmaq, you had to have many treaties or at least many diferent chiefs had 
to agree to the treaty because as they came to realize, every chief was autonomous 
… they wouldn’t take orders from the chief in the next community … it’s a very 
decentralized system and there was no superchief that the British could ever fnd. 
Tere are several reasons to question Doctor Patterson’s evidence as the
authoritative source on how Mìgmaq traditionally organized themselves. First, 
it is entirely informed from the perspective of British ofcials. I am not aware 
of any writings by the Mìgmaq people who share this perspective. Sources like 
the report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) paint a very 
diferent picture of Mìgmaq socio-political organization as having a multi-level 
(e.g., a federal) structure of governance.10 
Second, the perceptions of the British and their motivations for executing 
treaties with Mìgmaq as they did were likely infuenced by a variety of factors; 
it is by no means certain that this was driven solely by how Mìgmaq actually 
organized themselves. Te perspective of the British, as outsiders to the Mìgmaq 
culture, give reasons to question their conclusions. As noted by Jaime Battiste, 
an advisor to the Mìgmawei Grand Council (“Mawiomi”), the British perception 
of local or individual treaty making with small collectives of Mìgmaq “may be a 
Crown perspective, but it is not a shared understanding of the Mawio’mi. Te 
Mawio’mi assert the core treaty is 1725–26 with the rest of the treaties ratifying 
or renewals of this treaty apply to all Mi’kmaq according to Mi’kmaq law.”11 
9. Bernard NBCA, supra note 2 (Factum of the Respondent at para 12). 
10. 10 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol 1 
(Canada Communication Group, 1991) at 50-53 [RCAP Volume One]. 
11. Jaime Battiste, “Understanding the Progression of Mi’kmaw Law” (2008) 31 
Dal LJ 311 at 332. 










Finally, Doctor Patterson’s observations come two hundred years after 
contact. For the purposes of the Aboriginal rights test, the SCC has said that 
the relevant time frame for assessing Aboriginal culture is pre-contact. Te 
Mìgmaq socio-political organization might have changed signifcantly between 
the ffteenth and eighteenth century, especially in response to the arrival of 
the French and British. Terefore, Doctor Patterson’s conclusions were both 
questionable and not particularly germane to the question of how Mìgmaq 
traditionally organized themselves. 
Our submissions on appeal resisted the attempt to prove Aboriginal rights 
holders as if this is simply a question of historical or documentary proof. 
We insisted that the Mìgmaq nation was the rights holder as a matter of law 
and that questions such as “who are the members of the nation?” and “who may 
exercise rights belonging to the nation?” are internal matters for the nation to 
decide and not the courts. Such arguments were resisted in the lower courts. 
In particular, the trial judge implied foodgates concerns about the prospect of 
the Mìgmaq nation as the rights-holder. Dismissing this possibility, they asked: 12 
Can the Mi’gmaq nation qualify as the community? 
If it can then it would at frst blush appear that any status Indian who is a member 
of any Mi’gmaq band could exercise the [A]boriginal right to hunt for food in any 
traditional hunting territory of the Mi’gmaq people. 
As counsel for Mr. Bernard, I argued this approach implicitly privileges 
the colonial constructs of Indian Act reserves, while failing to account for the 
damage Indian Act policy has caused the Mìgmaq people, including Mr. Bernard 
and his family. Furthermore, we argued that the Mìgmaq nation as the proper 
rights-holder and governing entity need not raise any “foodgates” concerns, 
because it has the responsibility to manage the right to hunt, allowing the Mìgmaq 
people to determine who can exercise such rights and on what conditions. 
Before diving deeper into how the New Brunswick court addressed the law 
and our arguments, I want to frst focus on the Mìgmaw person at the centre of 
this case, by considering his family history, and the impact this case had on him 
and his family. I believe it is important to remember that cases like this afect real 
Indigenous people—people who have been impacted by the legacy of colonialism. 
In the face of these impacts, Stephen, like so many other Indigenous people I 
know (myself included), have a deep yearning to reconnect with their culture— 
to learn and to practice things their ancestors did: hunt, fsh, harvest, speak their 
language, dance, sing, drum, learn stories and protocols, make traditional items, 
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et cetera. When the Court talks about the purpose of section 35 being geared 
at reconciliation, this is what I hope they intend at the very least: Tat section 
35 is a vehicle to facilitate Indigenous peoples preserving their culture.13 In R v 
Sappier and R v Gray, the Court confrmed that the purpose of Aboriginal rights 
is to give “protection [to] the distinctive cultures of [A]boriginal peoples” and to 
“provide cultural security and continuity for the particular [A]boriginal society.”14 
Yet, my experience in the R v Bernard case has made me question whether the 
convoluted Aboriginal rights framework conceived in Van der Peet, which gives 
lower court judges so much leeway in interpreting its meaning, is even capable of 
achieving this minimum objective. 
II. STEPHEN BERNARD 
FIGURE 2: STEPHEN BERNARD AND HIS LEGAL TEAM AT THE NEW BRUNSWICK 
COURT OF APPEAL. 
NOTE: From left to right: Roy Stewart, Naiomi Metallic, Stephen Bernard, and Rosalie Francis. 
13. In actual fact, I think that section 35 should do more than just this minimum, and subscribe 
to the view that the content of section 35 is as least as fulsome as the guarantees found in the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295 (entered into 
force 13 September 2007) [UNDRIP]. 
14. R v Sappier; R v Gray, 2006 SCC 54 at paras 22, 33 [Sappier; Gray]. 









Stephen was born in Saint John, New Brunswick and has lived there his entire 
life. Stephen’s grandfather, Louis Edward Bernard, born 15 March 1905, grew up 
on the Indian Brook reserve (today called Sipekne’katik First Nation) and was a 
registered Indian under the Indian Act. In his early twenties, Louis Edward left 
the reserve and moved to Saint John to fnd work. Tere, he met and married 
Catherine Cory in 1929 and the couple had fve children, including Stephen’s 
father, Charles Herbert. 
When Canada joined World War II, Louis Edward enlisted in the war efort. 
As a result of enlisting, Louis Edward became “enfranchised,” involuntarily 
losing his registered Indian status under the Indian Act and as a member of 
the Sipekne’katik First Nation. Tis was a common practice of the Canadian 
government at the time.15 Tis had the efect of legally disentitling Louis 
Edward—as well as his wife, children, and grandchildren—from returning to 
live in the Sipekne’katik First Nation, as only registered Indian band members 
are entitled to live on reserve pursuant to the Indian Act. 
In 1985, Canada amended the Indian Act in order to address some of the 
discrimination in its registration provisions. Te amendments permitted many 
of those who had lost status, and their children, to be reinstated to Indian status 
and as members of the bands they had formerly belonged to.16 At this time, 
Stephen’s grandfather and father had died, but Stephen, his siblings, living aunts, 
uncles, and cousins became eligible to register. Stephen applied for registration 
and received it in 1992. At the same time, he was reinstated to the Sipekne’katik 
First Nation, the band from which his grandfather had been removed. 
While Stephen and his family have always maintained connections to the 
Sipekne’katik First Nation by visiting relatives and Stephen living there one 
summer as a teenager, his home has always been Saint John. To that end, Stephen 
has hunted in the Saint John area all of his life. After becoming registered under 
15. RCAP Volume One, supra note 9 at 524. 
16. Much has been written on the history of the Indian Act registration provisions. See e.g.
Pamela D Palmater, Beyond Blood – Rethinking Indigenous Identity (Purich, 2011); Bonita 
Lawrence, “Real” Indians and Others: Mixed-Blood Urban Native Peoples and Indigenous 
Nationhood (UBC Press, 2004); Sebastien Grammond, “Discrimination in the Rules of 
Indian Status and the McIvor Case” (2009) 35 Queen’s LJ 421; Ian Peach, “Section 15 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Future of Federal Regulation of Indian 
Status” (2012) 45 UBC L Rev 103; Mary Eberts, “McIvor: Justice Delayed—Again” (2010) 
9 Indigenous LJ 15; Val Napoleon, “Extinction By Number: Colonialism Made Easy” (2001) 
16 CJLS 113; Martin J Cannon, “Revisiting Histories of Gender-Based Exclusion and the 
New Politics of Indian Identity” (2008) National Centre for First Nations Governance; 
Bonita Lawrence, “Gender, Race, and the Regulation of Native Identity in Canada and the 
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the Indian Act, he sought to hunt without a license on the basis of being Mìgmaw 
and having an Aboriginal right to do so. On previous occasions while hunting, 
carrying only his Indian status card, Stephen was told by Department of Natural 
Resources ofcials that he was able to hunt without a license so long as he stayed 
east of the Saint John River. Despite adhering to this direction, Stephen was 
charged on 16 November 2004, with unlawfully hunting deer without a license, 
contrary to New Brunswick’s Fish and Wildlife Act.17 Mr. Bernard pled not 
guilty to the alleged ofence based on an Aboriginal right to hunt for food in the 
Saint John area. 
Tis was the start of Stephen’s legal odyssey that would last for over 
twelve years. His case is remarkable for a number of reasons. First, Stephen 
was self-represented during his trial and for part of his frst appeal to the 
New Brunswick Queen’s Bench. Tis is no small feat for any non-lawyer, but 
particularly so for an Indigenous person mounting a complex Aboriginal rights 
defence. Stephen and his family are not of signifcant means (he works in waste 
disposal for the municipality). He would have preferred to have had a lawyer 
during the trial, but could not aford one. He reached out to his band, as well 
as a number of Aboriginal organizations for fnancial assistance with the case, 
but none was forthcoming. I frst encountered Stephen when he was seeking 
representation before the Queen’s Bench and I assisted him in making an 
application to New Brunswick Legal Aid for representation, which he had for 
part of his frst appeal. Tis required Stephen to put a lien on his house, which 
was his only major asset. On his appeal to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, 
with the support of the Mìgmaq leadership in the province, I agreed to represent 
Stephen pro bono. I was assisted on the case by a junior associate and an articling 
clerk, who were also Mìgmaq. 
Second, although he was not able to secure legal counsel for the trial, Stephen 
was able to persuade a history professor at the University of New Brunswick, 
Doctor Greg Marquis, to be his expert witness on a pro bono basis. With Doctor 
Marquis’ research, Stephen was able to disprove a long-held belief that Mìgmaq 
hunting territory did not expand into the Saint John River Watershed.18 Tis 
was also no small feat. Te “Gagnon Line” theory had long operated as a bar to 
the recognition of Mìgmaq rights in the west of the province.19 Te fnding that 
17. Fish and Wildlife Act, SNB 1980, c F-4.1, s 32(1)(b). 
18. See Bernard NBPC, supra note 2 at para 101. 
19. See Greg Marquis, “Te Story of a Map: W.F. Ganong and Tribal Boundaries in New 
Brunswick” in Karl S Hele & Regna Darnell, eds, Papers of the 39th Algonquian Conference
(University of Western Ontario, 2008) 479. 
(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL











Mìgmaq hunting territory included parts of the Saint John River Watershed was 
not challenged on appeal and changed the law in New Brunswick. 
Stephen’s persistence in his desire to have his rights as a Mìgmaq person 
recognized is truly admirable. Te trial hearing was delayed a number of times 
and it was only in 2010 that judgment was rendered. Stephen had a strong 
claim for ofcially induced error to the charge, but did not pursue it because he 
wanted to win on the basis of an Aboriginal right. Although Stephen was found 
guilty, the trial judge expressed signifcant reluctance to impose the mandatory 
minimum fne of two thousand dollars and the mandatory jail term of seven 
days on Stephen.20 On the same day, by consent order, the trial judge’s decision 
was stayed by the Court of Queen’s Bench pending summary conviction appeal. 
Although the Queen’s Bench judge on frst appeal ultimately endorsed the trial 
judge’s analysis, the judge also expressed regret at arriving at this result in the 
reasons, issuing a permanent stay to the fne of two thousand dollars and the 
minimum statutory sentence of seven days in jail.21 Tis was not appealed by the 
Crown. While Stephen would not face any penalty, he nonetheless wanted to 
pursue an appeal to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal to have his Aboriginal 
right recognized. On this appeal, we argued that the fact that both the lower court 
judges lamented the result strongly suggests that there was something wrong with 
the approach taken in the courts below. 
I end this section by returning to the importance of this case to Stephen’s 
cultural identity. He told me how much it hurt him during the trial when he had 
to listen to the Crown lawyer make submissions (based on the Crown’s argument 
that the Powley identity test was applicable) that Stephen was not “Aboriginal” 
enough to meet this test, because he did not visit his relatives in Sipekne’katik 
enough or go to enough powwows.22 It also hurt Stephen deeply that he could 
20. See Bernard NBQB, supra note 2 at para 35. 
21. Bernard NBQB, supra note 2 at para 39. 
22. Bernard NBCA is one of a recent number of cases from the Maritimes involving Aboriginal 
rights claims by of-reserve Mìgmaq people, both status and non-status. See R v Acker, 2004 
NBPC 24; R v Lavigne, 2005 NBPC 8, af’d 2007 NBQB 171; R v Walker, 2005 NSPC 
1; R v Hopper, 2008 NBCA 42; R v Chiasson, 2012 NBPC 14; R v Vienneau, 2017 NBCA 
20; R v Keith Boucher, 2015 NBPC 6; and R v Lamb, 2018 NBQB 213. In cases involving 
non-status Mìgmaq living of-reserve, we see lower courts in both provinces, in response to 
Crown submissions, adapting the R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43 [Powley] “communal acceptance” 
test to determine an individual’s status as a rights-holder. It is beyond the scope of this article 
to analyze these cases, but they do suggest problems with having non-Indigenous Crown 
judges apply their own preconceptions about what constitutes communal acceptance and 
living an “Aboriginal lifestyle” especially for those who have lost status and/or were displaced 
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not hunt during the duration of his legal ordeal and supply meat for family. For 
him, being able to hunt was one of the few ways he could connect with culture 
as an of-reserve Mìgmaw person. He wrote about this in the last paragraph of 
his trial submissions:23 
Te defendant is a registered Mi’kmaq Indian who has resided in Saint John, New 
Brunswick his entire life. He does not have cultural supports and community that 
those residing on reserves have and he will not be able to pass his status on to his 
children. He has a white mother and his children have a white mother. His Indian 
status ends with him. Te only connection he has to his ancestors, who resided 
in this area for thousands of years, is that once a year for a few weeks he can hunt 
without having to acquire a licence. It was a source of pride that the province of New 
Brunswick recognized his Native heritage. Te defendant could very easily have 
purchased a hunting license, but that would have been denying his father, his father’s 
father and a line that stretches back thousands of years into the prehistory of this 
area. Tat would have meant saying he is not Mi’kmaq. And that he would not do. 
III. THE TRIAL DECISION 
As noted above, Mr. Bernard was successful in establishing all elements of the 
Van der Peet test. On the requirement of proving an integral practice or tradition, 
the trial judge found that “there was no dispute” that hunting was a signifcant 
practice to the Mìgmaq people.24 On the site-specifc requirement,25 after 
carefully considering the expert evidence over numerous pages of his decision, the 
trial judge concluded that there was compelling evidence to fnd that the lower 
Saint John River Valley and in particular, the Saint John area were traditional 
Mìgmaq hunting grounds prior to contact.26 Te judge noted that the evidence 
demonstrated the existence of a Mìgmaq village some hundred years after contact, 
which the judge found particularly indicative of a Mìgmaq community.27 
It was at the fnal stage of the Aboriginal rights test on the question of 
whether “the claimed modern right has a reasonable degree of continuity with 
23. Bernard NBPC, supra note 2 (Trial Brief of the Defendant). 
24. See Bernard NBPC, supra note 2 at para 36. 
25. See R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139 at para 39 [Côté]; R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101 at 
para 30 [Adams]. 
26. See Bernard NBPC, supra note 2 at paras 76-101; Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33 at 
para 56 [Mitchell]. 
27. Bernard NBPC, supra note 2 at para 101. 











the ‘integral’ pre-contact practice,” where the trial judge’s reasoning went awry. 
Tis is where he invents a new continuity test: 28 
[Test 1] In this case there is evidence of continuity of the nature of the practice that 
the Mìgmaq continued the same practice of hunting these animals for food post 
contact, the practice remained communal and continues in an evolved form. 
[Test 2] However there appears to be an argument that another test or requirement 
with respect to continuity was set out in Van der Peet. While recognizing that an 
[A]boriginal right is specifc to the site and the history of each community, and 
must be determined on a case by case basis, does the applicant have to show continuity 
of the ‘contemporary community’ and its practices with the historic community 
and its practices? 
Te judge then appears to attribute this second test for continuity to 
comments made by Justice McLachlin (as she then was) in dissent in Van der Peet
referencing a part of the Australian Mabo v Queensland (No 2).29 Te quote from 
Mabo emphasized the importance of an Aboriginal group’s connection to territory 
or resources. Judge Brien then identifes a test set out by Justice McLachlin in 
dissent in Van der Peet, which he characterizes as30 
helpful for addressing a situation as found in this case: An [A]boriginal right is not 
lost by abandonment or cessation of exercise if a traditional connection with the 
land has been substantially maintained by observance of the custom tradition or 
practice, including a link to the resource in question. 
A few paragraphs later, the trial judge cites paragraph 27 of the Powley
decision as evidence of the majority of the Court’s approval of Justice McLachlin’s 
above-noted position in Van der Peet.31 After dismissing the possibility that the 
Mìgmaq nation itself could be the rights-holder (quoted in the introduction), 
the trial judge applied his new continuity test to the facts. Te judge mused that 
the original group of Mìgmaq, since they left the vicinity and did not return, 
might have abandoned their rights. However, he states that it is not necessary to 
defnitively determine this since Mr. Bernard failed to show any connection to 
this group in the frst place:32 
In such a case then is there a point in time where abandonment can cause the loss 
of an [A]boriginal right. Tere may be, but that is not for this court to decide. For 
me the issue in this case now comes down to whether the community which left the 
28. Ibid at paras 47-48 [emphasis added]. 
29. [1992] HCA 23 [Mabo]. 
30. Bernard NBPC, supra note 2 at para 53. 
31. Ibid at paras 61-62. 
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area and the exercise of the practice has substantially maintained a connection to 
the land, including the locus in quo. Such community can resume the exercise of its 
[A]boriginal right, but in order to resume something one must have had exercised 
the right in the frst place. 
Te Defendant has neither shown the existence of nor his belonging to that 
community of Mi’kmaq in whom the right to resume the practice still rests. Te 
mere movement of his grandfather to Saint John from Nova Scotia’s Indian Brook 
Band, and nothing more does not establish the necessary connection. Similarly, the 
Defendant’s own activity in hunting in the area without a licence, does not satisfy 
the connection mentioned. He only substantially maintains the connection if he 
can establish the original connection. He is but one individual, and one individual 
according to the Mclaughlin [sic] test which I have adopted would have difculty in 
proving the connection required. 
On this ground alone, Mr. Bernard lost his Aboriginal rights defence. 
At the frst appeal level, the New Brunswick Queen’s Bench ultimately endorsed 
the trial judge’s reasoning. Te Queen’s Bench also added to it by suggesting 
that the trial judge’s reasoning was consistent with the Court’s approach to 
treaty benefciaries articulated in Marshall (No 2),33 which he characterized as 
“narrow[ing] the location for the exercise of [A]boriginal and treaty rights from 
broad words suggesting almost anywhere to ‘the area traditionally used by the 
local community.’”34 
IV. OUR SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT OF APPEAL 
As summarized in section II, our submissions to the Court of Appeal were twofold. 
First, we argued that the lower court judges erred in introducing the CCR as part 
of the Aboriginal rights test. Second, we argued that a better alternative to the 
CCR was to identify the Mìgmaq nation as the rights holders and to have any 
foodgates concerns addressed by acknowledging that the Mìgmaq right to hunt 
includes the right to decide who can participate in the right to hunt. 
In this section, I explain that the legal justifcation of our arguments is supported 
by the SCC. I do this in order to be able to later credibly critique the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal’s cursory dismissal of our submissions and afrmation 
of the lower courts’ reasons. 
33. R v Marshall (No 2), [1999] 3 SCR 533 [Marshall (No 2)]. 
34. Bernard NBQB, supra note 2 at para 24. 

















A. WHY THE APPLICATION OF CCR TO ABORIGINAL RIGHTS CLAIMS BY 
FIRST NATIONS PEOPLE IS INCORRECT 
1. THE CCR IS INCONSISTENT WITH HOW MÌGMAQ ORGANIZED 
THEMSELVES 
First, by using the evidentiary record and passages from the RCAP, we emphasized 
that Mìgmaq were traditionally a group who practised transhumance (i.e., they 
were migratory) and therefore, group composition varied according to season and 
several other factors.35 By this, we were seeking to dispel the fction that Mìgmaq 
lived in relatively independent, fxed, and sedentary communities (which the 
lower courts’ perception of the Saint John Mìgmaq community seems to have 
been mired in). We emphasized that the Mìgmaq people traditionally organized 
themselves into sub-groups that were mobile and fssionable, who could divide 
into small units and recombine into larger units at diferent times. 
Second, we emphasized that Mìgmaq land-use patterns were greatly 
afected by the arrival of Europeans, resulting in signifcant displacement. Here, 
we discussed assimilationist reserve policies in the colonies of New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia,36 centralization eforts in both provinces in the twentieth 
century,37 and various Indian Act enfranchisement provisions that disentitled 
signifcant numbers of Mìgmaq from registration,38 including Mr. Bernard’s 
own grandfather. We were seeking to dispel what seemed to be another fction 
underlying the reasoning of the lower courts: Current reserves are a natural 
refection of (or had become the proxy for) how Mìgmaq traditionally lived 
35. See RCAP Volume One, supra note 9 at 53. 
36. For example, we noted the passing of legislation in both colonies enabling the unilateral sale 
of reserve lands to non-Indian squatters in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. See An Act to 
regulate the management and disposal of the Indian Reserves in this Province, SNB 1844, c 47; 
An Act to provide for the Instruction and Permanent Settlement of the Indians, SNS 1842, c 16. 
37. In the 1940s, attempting to centralize all the “Indians” in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
by relocating reserve populations to two central reserves in each province (Indian Brook and 
Eskasoni in Nova Scotia and Kingsclear and Big Cove in New Brunswick). Te so-called 
“Centralization Policy” largely failed, but did succeed in dislocating some families. By way 
of illustration, the Mìgmaq community of Sipekne’katik consists of various families who 
historically lived in other districts. See RCAP Volume One, supra note 9 at 395; Daniel Paul, 
We Were Not the Savages: A Mi’kmak Perspective on the Collision between European and Native 
American Civilizations (Fernwood, 2000) at 257; Martha Walls, “Countering the ‘Kingsclear 
Blunder’: Maliseet Resistance to the Kingsclear Relocation Plan, 1945–1949” (2008) 37 
Acadiensis 3; Bernard NBPC, supra note 2 (Provincial Court Transcript) VIV at 145. 
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(which appears to have been based on assumptions that Mìgmaq lived in static 
village sites). 
2. THE CCR CONFUSES RESERVES AS “TRADITIONAL” 
We stressed that Indian Act reserves did not exist pre-contact and that they are a 
product of Canada’s colonial past. Tey were never intended as places to preserve 
the culture, traditions, and composition of the peoples who were forced to live 
on them; rather, their object was to isolate and to segregate “Indians” so that they 
could be gradually assimilated into mainstream society, as well as to make way 
for settlement by colonizers. With this point, we stressed that an approach that 
appears to privilege reserves in determining rights-holders would be inconsistent 
with the purpose of section 35. We argued that, in pursuing reconciliation, 
governments and courts must tread carefully not to unwittingly perpetuate 
stereotypes about Aboriginal people or to prioritize colonial constructs.39 
More specifcally on this point, we argued that it would be wrong to assume 
that the location and membership of today’s reserve communities correspond 
to how the Mìgmaq people organized or situated themselves in the past.40 
Indeed, Mìgmaq had little to no say in the reserve system. Yet the judges in 
lower courts appeared to place great weight on: (1) the absence of a Mìgmaq 
reserve community at Saint John (interpreting this as an abandonment of rights 
and claims to the area); and (2) Mr. Bernard’s connections to another Mìgmaq 
reserve, namely Sipekne’katik First Nation (assuming that any Aboriginal rights 
exercisable by Mr. Bernard existed only in or around Sipekne’katik First Nation). 
3. THE CCR PENALIZES THE OFF-RESERVE POPULATION 
We also argued that the lower court decisions, in efect, penalized First Nation 
individuals who leave their reserves to live elsewhere (and ignores whether they 
remain within traditional Mìgmaq territory as the Bernard family did). Tis 
fails to recognize that, in addition to having no say in what reserves they were 
39. See Sappier; Gray, supra note 13 at paras 45-46. 
40. See Battiste, supra note 10 at 339-40. Battiste observes that: 
While the practice of aboriginal and treaty rights can be modernized, the Aboriginal sovereignty 
and territory that is the constitutional source of the rights cannot be substituted by federally or 
provincially created entities, such as the Indian Act bands or individual registered Indians. Tis 
is especially so when a continuing traditional sovereign and government, like the Mawio’mi, 
still exists… [Te] continued use of the federal Indian Act in constitutional rights litigation is 
inconsistent with constitutional supremacy and the Mawio’mi rights, and as such the Indian 
Act should not have any place, force or efect in cases dealing with the context of [section] 35 
rights (ibid at 339-40). 











placed on, some Mìgmaq (i.e., those who were enfranchised or relocated as part 
of centralization) had no choice in leaving (or had no ability to return in the 
case of Mr. Bernard’s grandfather). While seemingly making a choice to leave, 
others might have done so in order to fee residential schools or the memories of 
them, or to seek better opportunities, or housing. In Corbière v Canada (Minister 
of Indian and Northern Afairs), Justice L’Heureux-Dubé identifed these as 
“choice[s] made reluctantly or at a high personal cost.”41 Tese are not choices for 
which First Nations individuals should be penalized. Here, this choice to leave 
should not be taken as a decision by Mr. Bernard’s late grandfather—or any of 
his descendants—to abandon their culture or renounce protection of that culture 
under section 35(1). 
4. THE CCR IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 35 AND 
RECONCILIATION 
We also stressed the purpose of section 35(1), which was recently emphasized 
by the Court in Sappier and Gray that “[f ]lexibility is important when engaging 
in the Van der Peet analysis because the object is to provide cultural security and 
continuity for the particular [A]boriginal society.”42 We argued that an approach 
that efectively denies the rights of of-reserve members of the Aboriginal society 
in question—arguably those most vulnerable to losing their connection to their 
culture (according to Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Corbière)43—does not appear to 
be in keeping with this guidance. 
We further argued that the lower court placed an impossible evidentiary 
burden on Mr. Bernard to conclusively prove his connection to a specifc 
sub-group throughout four centuries when no written records existed. Te Court 
has signalled on several occasions that reconciliation means avoiding approaches 
that would entail impossible evidentiary burdens.44 Requiring Mr. Bernard to 
prove direct descent of the sub-group of Mìgmaq at Saint John pre-contact 
renders any Aboriginal rights he may have as a Mìgmaq person illusory. 
41. [1999] 2 SCR 203 at para 62 [Corbière]. 
42. Sappier; Gray, supra note 13 at para 33 [emphasis added]. 
43. Corbière, supra note 37 at paras 71-72. 
44. See Simon v R, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at paras 39-41 [Simon]; Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para 
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5. THE LAW MERELY REQUIRES SHOWING CONTINUITY OF A PRACTICE— 
NOT PEOPLES 
Next, we turned to the Court’s Aboriginal rights framework to show that the 
Court has never endorsed a CCR. Continuity as an element of the Aboriginal 
rights framework relates only to showing continuity of the practice alleged to be 
an Aboriginal right between pre-contact and modern times by the Aboriginal 
nation. In Van der Peet, where the continuity requirement was frst introduced, 
it was framed as the following: “Te practices, customs and traditions which 
constitute [A]boriginal rights are those which have continuity with the practices, 
customs and traditions that existed prior to the contact.”45 Te Court’s discussion 
of this requirement makes it clear that this requirement’s focus is specifcally on 
the practices, customs, and traditions of an Aboriginal people or society and not 
on which members of that nation can exercise the right.46 
In R v Gladstone, the continuity requirement was described as “the requirement 
that a practice, custom or tradition which is integral to the [A]boriginal community 
now be shown to have continuity with the practices, customs or traditions which 
existed prior to contact.”47 Continuity was established in Gladstone on the fact 
that prior to contact, Heiltsuk society was, in signifcant part, based on such 
trade, and this continued after contact. In R v Adams, involving a Mohawk fshing 
right on the Saint Lawrence River, continuity was found to be established based 
on evidence showing “the practice of fshing had been going on for years and 
years” and “that hunting and fshing have been practiced by the Mohawks since 
time immemorial, and that the practice of fshing has not been interrupted.”48 
In R v Côté, the Court described the continuity test as “part of the second stage 
of the Van der Peet analysis, there must also be ‘continuity’ between [A]boriginal
practices, customs and traditions that existed prior to contact and a particular 
practice, custom or tradition that is integral to Aboriginal communities today.”49 
Te requirement of continuity was found to be met in Côté by expert testimony, 
concluding that “fshing is a traditional activity that is continuing, is a traditional 
activity that has remained important.”50 
45. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para 59 [emphasis removed]. 
46. Ibid at paras 60-67. 
47. [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 28 [Gladstone]. 
48. Adams, supra note 23 at para 47. 
49. Côté, supra note 23 at para 69. 
50. Ibid at para 70. 
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6. THE CCR TURNS THE ABORIGINAL RIGHTS TEST INTO THE ABORIGINAL 
TITLE TEST 
None of the above SCC cases discuss or impose the CCR. We argued that such 
a requirement efectively converts the Aboriginal rights test into the test for 
Aboriginal title. Requiring community continuity at the site is really the same 
thing as requiring regular use and occupation—one of the main requirements for 
proving Aboriginal title.51 Such an approach runs contrary to the Court’s clear 
guidance that site-specifc Aboriginal rights can exist even if an Aboriginal group 
is not able to make out a title to a particular location. Tis was frst emphasized 
in Van der Peet:52 
[A]boriginal rights and [A]boriginal title are related concepts; [A]boriginal title is a 
sub-category of [A]boriginal rights which deals solely with claims of rights to land. 
Te relationship between [A]boriginal title and [A]boriginal rights must not, however, 
confuse the analysis of what constitutes an [A]boriginal right. Aboriginal rights arise 
from the prior occupation of land, but they also arise from the prior social organization 
and distinctive cultures of [A]boriginal peoples on that land. In considering whether 
a claim to an [A]boriginal right has been made out, courts must look at both the 
relationship of an [A]boriginal claimant to the land and at the practices, customs 
and traditions arising from the claimant’s distinctive culture and society. Courts 
must not focus so entirely on the relationship of [A]boriginal peoples with the land 
that they lose sight of the other factors relevant to the identifcation and defnition of 
[A]boriginal rights. 
In Adams, the Court repeated a similar caution, this time raising the danger 
that overemphasizing connection to land would have the impact of depriving 
groups who were nomadic, or who were displaced from their land, of the beneft 
of section 35:53 
To understand why [A]boriginal rights cannot be inexorably linked to [A]boriginal
title it is only necessary to recall that some [A]boriginal peoples were nomadic, varying 
the location of their settlements with the season and changing circumstances. Tat 
this was the case does not alter the fact that nomadic peoples survived through reliance 
on the land prior to contact with Europeans and, further, that many of the customs, 
practices and traditions of nomadic peoples that took place on the land were integral to 
their distinctive cultures. Te [A]boriginal rights recognized and afrmed by s. 35(1)
should not be understood or defned in a manner which excludes some of those the 
provision was intended to protect. 
51. Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at paras 152-54 [Delgamuukw]. 
52. Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para 74 [emphases added]. 
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Moreover, some [A]boriginal peoples varied the location of their settlements both 
before and after contact. Te Mohawks are one such people; the facts accepted by 
the trial judge in this case demonstrate that the Mohawks did not settle exclusively 
in one location either before or after contact with Europeans. Tat this is the case 
may (although I take no position on this point) preclude the establishment of 
[A]boriginal title to the lands on which they settled; however, it in no way subtracts 
from the fact that, wherever they were settled before or after contact, prior to contact the 
Mohawks engaged in practices, traditions or customs on the land which were integral to 
their distinctive culture. 
Finally, in Côté, the Court again repeated a similar position:54 
We wish to reiterate the fact that there is no a priori reason why the defning practices, 
customs and traditions of such societies and communities should be limited to those 
practices, customs and traditions which represent incidents of a continuous and historical 
occupation of a specifc tract of land. 
We stressed in our submissions that these principles had direct application in 
the case of the Mìgmaq people, who traditionally had migratory land use patterns 
that were also greatly afected by the arrival of Europeans and the displacement 
that followed. It is more than likely that the Mìgmaq people, who were at Saint 
John around the time of contact (and their descendants), did not disappear forever 
but moved (either voluntarily or by coercion) to other parts of Mìgmaq territory 
in what is now New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Tey were eventually made to 
settle on a reserve. Some may have started out on one reserve and were moved to 
another through centralization. Some of these original Mìgmaq may have stayed 
in Saint John, but remained hidden to outsiders. Mìgmaq who live in and around 
Saint John today should not be penalized for the displacement of earlier Mìgmaq 
(or for the fact that a Mìgmaq reserve was never established in Saint John) by 
being denied a constitutional right that allows them to participate in and to 
celebrate their culture within their own territory. Te trial judge’s preoccupation 
with the specifc group of Mìgmaq in Saint John pre-contact caused him to focus 
on the connection to land and to lose sight of the importance of hunting to Mr. 
Bernard and to the Mìgmaq people generally. Furthermore, the trial judge did 
not consider the Mìgmaq peoples’ desire to preserve and to continue this practice 
in those areas where their ancestors used to hunt. 
54. Côté, supra note 23 at para 38 [emphasis added]. 










7. THE CCR INTRODUCES THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTINGUISHMENT OF
RIGHTS BY ABANDONMENT WHICH THERE IS NO PRECEDENT FOR 
We attacked the concept of abandonment considered by the trial judge. Tis has 
never been a part of the test for Aboriginal rights. What the trial judge failed to 
appreciate is that Justice McLachlin’s reference to the Mabo decision in Van der 
Peet was in the context of discussing how the common law continued to recognize 
the rights of Aboriginal peoples after European discovery and occupation of 
“new” territory.55 Mabo—which recognized Aboriginal title in Australia—was 
presented as an example to illustrate this point. Justice McLachlin was not 
introducing a test for “abandonment” of rights in this passage. Terefore, the 
import of this passage was misconstrued by the trial judge. Tis becomes obvious 
later in Van der Peet, where Justice McLachlin summarizes how Aboriginal rights 
are to be established:56 
If an [A]boriginal people can establish that it traditionally fshed in a certain area, it 
continues to have a similar right to do so, barring extinguishment or treaty. … Te 
[A]boriginal right to fsh may be defned as the right to continue to obtain from the river 
or the sea in question that which the particular [A]boriginal people have traditionally 
obtained from the portion of the river or sea. If the [A]boriginal people show that they 
traditionally sustained themselves from the river or sea, then they have a prima facie 
right to continue to do so, absent a treaty exchanging that right for other consideration. 
No mention here is made of abandonment. Further, in stating what is 
required to establish a prima facie Aboriginal right, Justice McLachlin only 
requires historical use of a site; not historical use coupled with continuous use of 
the site up to the present (which is what the trial judge interpreted the Justice to 
be suggesting). Not only does Justice McLachlin not propose an abandonment 
test, but the majority in Van der Peet specifcally declined to take a position 
on the suggestion in Mabo that Aboriginal title or a right could be abandoned 
through disappearance.57 Moreover, the Court has never returned to the subject 
of abandonment since Van der Peet. 
8. THE CCR INAPPROPRIATELY IMPORTED ELEMENTS FROM MÉTIS OR
TREATY TESTS 
Next, we explained why it was wrong to attempt to import either requirement 
from the Métis rights or treaty rights test into the test for Aboriginal rights for 
55. See Van der Peet, supra note 5 at paras 268-75. 
56. Ibid at paras 277-78 [emphasis added]. 
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First Nations people. Te trial judge relied on paragraph 27 from Powley to 
show that a majority of the Court had adopted the “Mclaughlin [sic] test” (i.e., 
the “community-continuity test”). Tis paragraph, directly under the heading 
“Identifcation of the Contemporary rights-Bearing Community” in Powley, 
discusses the requirement on claimants to prove the existence of modern Métis 
communities.58 We argued that these additions to the Van der Peet test are 
specifc to the Métis rights test and do not apply when a claim involves Indian 
or First Nations peoples. First, the Court has never imposed this requirement 
in any decisions subsequent to Powley involving claims by Indian or First 
Nations peoples.59 
Second, we argued that the reason for this diference in approach is due 
to the fact that the Indians or First Nations were distinct societies pre-existing
European contact and continued post-contact as recognizable societies, while the 
Métis have only come into existence through post-contact ethnogenesis.60 Since 
the Métis are “new” societies (who often went “underground”),61 it is clear why 
they would be required to prove they are distinct societies protected by section 
35. On the other hand, since the societies of Indian or First Nations, such as 
the Mìgmaq nation, were pre-existing societies that continue to be recognizable 
as distinct peoples, they need not prove they are an “Aboriginal people” within 
the meaning of section 35(1) in each Aboriginal rights case before the courts. 
Mìgmaq as an Aboriginal people is a notorious fact, of which the courts may take 
judicial notice. 
On the treaty rights approach, we argued that distinct approaches are 
warranted because Aboriginal rights and treaty rights serve diferent purposes. 
Treaty rights are about honouring the solemn promises made by the Crown to 
the members of an Aboriginal group and their heirs. Treaty rights are in the 
nature of a contract and therefore, there is a more defensible argument within the 
context that only the heirs of the original signatories ought to exercise the rights 
enshrined in those agreements. On the other hand, the goal of Aboriginal rights 
is broader: to provide cultural security and continuity for the Aboriginal society 
claiming the right.62 Based on these diferent objectives, a diferent approach to 
benefciaries and where they may exercise their rights could be justifed. Tat 
58. Bernard NBPC, supra note 2 at paras 54-62, citing Powley, supra note 20 at para 24. 
59. Tis includes Sappier; Gray, supra note 13; Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2011 SCC 56. 
60. See Powley, supra note 21 at paras 14, 36. 
61. Ibid at para 27. 
62. Sappier; Gray, supra note 13 at para 33. 
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said, we also pointed out that the obiter comments in Marshall (No 2) prioritizing 
“local communities” has been criticized as inconsistent with the Court decision 
in Marshall (No 1).63 
9. THE COURT JURISPRUDENCE SUGGESTS THE RIGHTS-HOLDER IS THE 
NATION OR PEOPLE—NOT SUB-GROUPS 
Finally, on the lower courts’ approach to the CCR, we emphasized that identifying 
the rights-holder here as a sub-group of the Mìgmaq people was unduly narrow 
and not consistent with previous SCC decisions. While the Court has yet to 
provide explicit guidance on who the benefciaries of an Aboriginal right are in a 
given case, the jurisprudence suggests a generous approach. Te Court has used 
a variety of terms to describe the benefciaries of Aboriginal rights. Tis includes 
the “group of [A]boriginal people,” “[A]boriginal community,”64 “societies,” 
“peoples,”65 and “[A]boriginal nation.”66 
On balance, the approach of the Court has been to favour descriptions 
of particular Aboriginal rights holders as the tribe or nation and not smaller 
band groupings, unless a sub-group identifes and understands itself as a distinct 
culture.67 Cases that have spoken in terms of “peoples,” “tribes,” or “nations” 
include Van der Peet (e.g., “the Sto:lo,” which is a nation made up of a 
collection of bands),68 R v NTC Smokehouse Ltd (which treated two tribes of 
the Nuu-chah-nulth identically given there was no diference in their cultures),69 
R v Nikal (e.g., “the We’suwet’en people” as opposed to the Moricetown band),70 
Adams (e.g., the “Mohawk” as opposed to Akwesasne band),71 Côté (e.g., the 
63. R v Marshall (No 1), [1999] 3 SCR 456 [Marshall (No 1)]; see also Marshall (No 2), supra
note 32 (it has been noted that had the Court applied its guidance on treaty benefciaries 
stated in Marshall (No 2) to the facts of this case, Donald Marshall Jr would not have been 
successful in establishing a treaty right, as he was from the Cape Breton band of Membertou 
but was fshing eels in an area of the Afton band located on mainland Nova Scotia); Bruce 
H Wildsmith QC, “Vindicating Mi’kmaq Rights: Te Struggle before, During and after 
Marshall” (2001) 19 Windsor YB Access Just 203 at 230-31; Battiste, “Understanding the 
Progression of Mi’kmaw Law,” supra note 10 at 332. 
64. See Van der Peet, supra note 5 at para 69. 
65. See Côté, supra note 23 at paras 38, 41. 
66. See Delgamuukw, supra note 47 at para 115. 
67. See R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1094-95 [Sparrow]; Gladstone, supra note 43 at para 
26 (this appears to have been the case in some decisions involving some west coast groups). 
68. See Van der Peet, supra note 5 at paras 2, 76, 80, 84-89, citing Supreme Court of British 
Columbia (1991) 58 BCLR (2d) 392 at para 8. 
69. [1996] 2 SCR 672 at paras 23, 66. 
70. [1996] 1 SCR 1013 at para 1. 
71. Adams, supra note 23 at para 37. 
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“Algonquin” as opposed to the Desert River band),72 Mitchell (e.g., “the Mohawk 
nation” as opposed to the Akwesasne band),73 Sappier, and Polchies (which 
speaks in terms of the distinctive culture and territories of “the Maliseet” and 
“the Mi’kmaq”).74 
B. THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE TO THE CCR IS HOLDING THE MÌGMAQ 
NATION AS THE RIGHTS-HOLDER 
1. MÌGMAQ WERE DECENTRALIZED, BUT NONETHELESS A NATION 
In addition to showing the fawed reasoning of the lower courts, we sought 
to introduce a better alternative. We argued here that it was obvious that the 
rights-holder had to be the Mìgmaq people as a whole. If this inspired fear of 
a free-for-all, we emphasized the Mìgmaq’s right to govern over hunting rights, 
including over deciding those who may exercise such rights. To counter the “lack 
of a Superchief” argument, we relied on the record and RCAP evidence once again 
to explain Mìgmaq’s socio-political organization. We acknowledge that although 
Mìgmaq generally travelled in smaller kinship groups, Mìgmaq saw themselves 
as forming part of a larger cultural, linguistic, and political group through the 
system of having district chiefs coming together through the Mawiomi.75 Te 
RCAP report spoke about Mìgmaq having a sophisticated federal system: 76 
Multi-level structures of governance are not new to First Nations. Many First Nations 
were traditionally organized in federations and confederacies. Te Mi’kmaq Nation 
is an example of a federal-type association. According to the accounts of interveners, 
the most basic unit in the Mi’kmaq Nation was the family, which joined together 
with other families for economic purposes at the local or community level—the level 
of the extended family or clan—in Mi’kmaq, wikamow. At this level, decisions were 
made concerning internal relations, social and seasonal movements, and assignment 
of community tasks. Leadership was provided by an individual sagamaw who 
worked closely with a council of elders, generally composed of the heads of families. 
Te next tier of organization occurred at the district or regional level. Te Mi’kmaq 
homeland of Mi’kma’ki comprised seven sakamowti, or districts, covering parts of 
present-day Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, 
St. Pierre and Miquelon, the Gaspé peninsula and the Magdalen Islands. Te 
political organization at this level, which included district chiefs, made decisions 
72. Côté, supra note 23 at para 6. 
73. See Mitchell, supra note 24 at para 2. 
74. Sappier; Gray, supra note 13 at paras 52-53. 
75. RCAP Volume One, supra note 9 at 50-53. 
76. Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Restructuring the Relationship, vol 2 
(Canada Communication Group, 1991) at 152. 











regarding war and peace and also assigned hunting territories to the various families 
living in the district. Te highest level of organization was the Mi’kmaq Nation. 
We suggested that the Court could take judicial notice of historical evidence 
identifed in the RCAP report.77 We emphasized that there was no evidence 
presented by either the Crown or Defence to suggest that the groups who make 
up the diferent districts of Mìgmàgi constituted separate tribes with distinct 
cultures and languages. We raised the fact that previous decisions of the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal and other courts have consistently treated Mìgmaq 
as one people or nation.78 
2. IT IS NOT THE ROLE OF THE COURTS TO DETERMINE INDIVIDUAL 
MEMBERS / RIGHTS-HOLDERS 
We stressed that, although it may be tempting to do so, courts should resist 
defning with precision who among the Mìgmaq can exercise site-specifc 
section 35 rights. Te goal of Aboriginal rights is to provide cultural security 
and continuity for the Aboriginal society in question. In this regard, it is the 
Aboriginal society itself that is best situated to determine how Aboriginal rights 
should be managed in order to achieve these objectives. Population demands, 
cultural, subsistence, social needs, ceremonial needs, Mìgmaq laws, and customs 
may all inform this determination. As well, the priorities to achieve these goals 
may also change over time. Non-Aboriginal governments and courts are unlikely 
to be knowledgeable about the priorities and needs of Aboriginal societies vis-à-vis 
the exercise of their Aboriginal rights. 
3. THE RIGHT TO HUNT INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO REGULATE WHO CAN HUNT 
We argued that the Mìgmaq right to govern over their hunting rights derives 
from the fact that Aboriginal rights are communal rights.79 In Sappier and Gray, 
77. Te courts may take judicial notice of Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples and other public reports like it. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the 
Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, (2015); David Stack, “Te 
First Decade of RCAP’s Infuence on Aboriginal Law” (2007) 70 Sask L Rev 123 at 140. 
Further, the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that it can take judicial notice of the facts 
of history whether past or contemporaneous: see R v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025 at para 60; 
Nikal, supra note 65 at para 26. 
78. See e.g. R v Bernard, 2003 NBCA 55 at para 71. 
79. See Sparrow, supra note 62 at 25; Delgamuukw, supra note 47 at para 115. See also Campbell 
v British Columbia, 2000 BCSC 1123 at paras 137-38, 141; Kent McNeil, “Te Jurisdiction 
of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments” (2007) National Centre for First Nations 
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the Court suggested that the communal nature of Aboriginal rights implies an 
included right of the community to make decisions with regard to the exercise 
of that right: 80 
Te right to harvest wood for domestic uses is a communal one. Section 35 recognizes 
and afrms existing [A]boriginal and treaty rights in order to assist in ensuring the 
continued existence of these particular [A]boriginal societies. Te exercise of the 
[A]boriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses must be tied to this purpose. 
Te right to harvest (which is distinct from the right to make personal use of the harvested 
product even though they are related) is not one to be exercised by any member of the 
[A]boriginal community independently of the [A]boriginal society it is meant to preserve.
It is a right that assists the society in maintaining its distinctive character. 
Furthermore, in earlier SCC decisions, the Court signaled that hunting and 
fshing rights include “the particular manner in which that right is exercised.”81 
In Nikal, the fshing right in question was found to include various “regulatory 
rights.”82 Included or incidental rights were also found in Côté,83 R v Simon,84 
and R v Sundown.85 
In response to the anticipated foodgates concern, we emphasized that our 
position would not mean that all Mìgmaq would descend on the Saint John 
area. Conservation considerations dictate that not all Mìgmaq could exercise the 
right. Further, we cited the Mìgmaq legal principle of netukulimk, which dictates 
that harvesters take no more than is needed,86 and the Cape Breton annual 
moose hunt regulated by the Mìgmaq Chiefs of Nova Scotia as an illustration 
of Mìgmaq’s responsible resource management in action.87 We emphasized that 
there is no evidence to suggest that the Mìgmaq of New Brunswick would ignore 
conservation considerations or their own principle of netukulimk; indeed, the 
80. Sappier; Gray, supra note 13 at para 26; see also Constance MacIntosh, “Developments in 
Aboriginal Law: Te 2006-2007 Term” (2007) 38 SCLR (2d) 1 at 28-29, 35. 
81. Sparrow, supra note 62 at 1112. 
82. Nikal, supra note 65 at paras 88-89. 
83. Côté, supra note 25 at para 56. 
84. See Simon, supra note 40 at para 28. 
85. [1999] 1 SCR 393 at paras 27-30. 
86. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, “Netukulimk Past and Present: Míkmaw Ethics and the Atlantic 
Fishery” (2002) 37 J Can Stud 15; Kerry Prosper, L Jane McMillan & Anthony A Davis, 
“Returning to Netukulimk: Mi’kmaq culture and spiritual connections with the resource 
stewardship and self-governance” (2011) 2 Intl Indigenous Policy J, art 7. 
87. See Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs, “Tia’muwe’l Netuklimkewe’l Unama’ki 
Moose Harvesting According to Netukulimk” (2009), online: <mikmaqrights.com/uploads/ 
MooseGuidelines.pdf>. 
















Court in Sparrow recognized that Aboriginal peoples generally have histories of 
conservation consciousness and interdependence with natural resources.88 
Finally, we acknowledged that a right to communal authority over the right to 
hunt is not an unqualifed or absolute right. Indeed, Aboriginal and treaty rights 
are not absolute and may be justifably infringed as long as the Crown satisfes 
the justifcation test set out in Sparrow.89 Tis requires the Crown to establish not 
only a compelling and substantive legislative objective, but also to show that the 
Crown’s actions are consistent with its fduciary duty towards Aboriginal people, 
including whether the Aboriginal people in question have been consulted and 
there is as little infringement as possible.90 However, no justifcation evidence was 
led by the Crown here. 
V. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION 
A panel of the Court of Appeal, composed of Justices Larlee and Quigg and Chief 
Justice Richard, issued a relatively short decision of sixty-six paragraphs. Most of 
it is dedicated to summarizing the lower court decisions. Our arguments about 
imposing an impossible evidentiary standard on claimants, reinforcing colonial 
constructs, and ignoring the rights of the of-reserve were not mentioned. 
Our arguments regarding the right of the Mìgmaq people to govern over 
hunting rights were dismissed, with the Court stating that our broader arguments 
on self-determination lacked a proper evidentiary foundation and therefore, 
could not be considered.91 However, the Court did acknowledge that the nature 
of communal rights mandates the community to regulate the exercise of these 
rights by its individual members. But such a right was restricted to the local 
community and not to any broader collectivity of Mìgmaq.92 
In the Court of Appeal’s view, there was only one real issue: whether the 
rights-holder could be a “tribe/nation.”93 Te Court concluded in the negative 
on this point. It appears the Court gave the greatest weight to a particular passage 
in Van der Peet: 94 
88. Sparrow, supra note 62 at 1119. 
89. Ibid at 1113-15. 
90. Ibid at 1113-21; see also Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at paras 81-82. 
91. See Bernard NBCA, supra note 2 at para 34. 
92. Ibid at para 58. 
93. Ibid at para 45. 
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In Van der Peet, Lamer C.J., for the majority, frequently referred to Aboriginal 
societies or the Aboriginal group claiming the right and spoke of the Aboriginal 
community demonstrating that a practice, custom or tradition is an Aboriginal 
right. Under the heading that claims to Aboriginal rights must be adjudicated on a 
specifc rather than general basis, he explains [at para 69]: 
Courts considering a claim to the existence of an [A]boriginal right must focus 
specifcally on the practices, customs and traditions of the particular [A]boriginal
group claiming the right. In the case of Kruger, supra, this Court rejected the notion 
that claims to [A]boriginal rights could be determined on a general basis. Tis position 
is correct; the existence of an [A]boriginal right will depend entirely on the practices, 
customs and traditions of the particular [A]boriginal community claiming the right. 
As has already been suggested, [A]boriginal rights are constitutional rights, but that 
does not negate the central fact that the interests [A]boriginal rights are intended to 
protect relate to the specifc history of the group claiming the right. Aboriginal rights are 
not general and universal; their scope and content must be determined on a case-by-
case basis. Te fact that one group of [A]boriginal people has an [A]boriginal right to 
do a particular thing will not be, without something more, sufcient to demonstrate that 
another [A]boriginal community has the same [A]boriginal right. Te existence of the 
right will be specifc to each [A]boriginal community. 
Beyond this, the Court of Appeal dismissed our arguments on the inappropriate 
mingling of concepts from the Métis, title, and treaty rights doctrines as 
“untenable,”95 suggesting that all these concepts could be mingled to inform the 
interpretation of Aboriginal rights: 96 
Te use of the broader term “Aboriginal rights” and the specifcation that these 
include Métis rights, makes it clear the Supreme Court [in Powley] was elaborating 
principles applicable to Aboriginal rights in general. … [I]t must be noted the 
Supreme Court in Van der Peet held that “[A]boriginal rights and [A]boriginal title 
are related concepts; [A]boriginal title is a sub-category of [A]boriginal rights” (para. 
74). Tus, cases dealing with [A]boriginal title certainly are relevant in [A]boriginal
rights cases. In addition, cases dealing with treaty rights can also be relevant where 
the Court has made general propositions that apply to all rights asserted under s. 
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
Te Court of Appeal explicitly disagreed with our contention that the 
“foodgates” concerns motivated the lower courts’ decision-making, countering 
95. Ibid at para 48. 
96. Ibid at paras 48-49. Te Court of Appeal also suggested at paragraph 63 that a diferent 
approach between Métis and other Aboriginal groups would be unfair: “Tere would seem 
to be no rational basis for the claim the Métis peoples only get to exercise [A]boriginal
rights that are grounded in the existence of a historic and present community, whereas other 
[A]boriginal peoples get to exercise the right regardless of whether it is so grounded.” 












that “[t]he trial judge simply applied the law as he understood it in Van der Peet 
and other cases.”97 
Our argument that the new CCR converted Aboriginal rights to title, contrary 
to warnings in Van der Peet, Côté, and Adams, was not specifcally addressed. 
In fact, after stating that concepts around title could inform the Aboriginal rights 
analysis, the Court of Appeal cited a passage from Marshall and Bernard (which 
is about the test for Aboriginal title) speaking of Aboriginal societies exercising 
control over village sites. Te Court of Appeal took this as confrming that 
rights-holders are smaller communities: “[T]he fact that [the] Court equated 
Aboriginal societies with protection of their village sites indicates the communal 
rights to which s. 35(1) refers are specifc to the smaller communities that 
exercised the rights at the site that is the subject of the proceeding.”98 Te Court 
of Appeal was oblivious to the fact that in doing so, it was again confating the 
Aboriginal rights test with the test for Aboriginal title. 
As to our argument that several SCC cases in fact suggest that the rights-holder 
is the broader nation or society, the Court of Appeal’s response left something to 
be desired. It circularly suggested that the rights-holder must necessarily be the 
local community simply because the Supreme Court described Aboriginal rights 
as “communal” in nature:99 
As all agree, s. 35(1) rights are communal rights. Te approach of the courts has 
been to recognize that an Aboriginal person is a benefciary of his/her community’s 
Aboriginal or treaty rights. Tese rights, whatever their specifc content, are 
exercised through the community’s consent and authority. In Delgamuukw, Lamer 
C.J. in discussing [A]boriginal title, which is a subset of [A]boriginal rights, stated 
as follows [at para 115]: 
A further dimension of [A]boriginal title is the fact that it is held communally. 
Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual [A]boriginal persons; it is a collective 
right to land held by all members of an [A]boriginal nation. Decisions with respect 
to that land are also made by that community. Tis is another feature of [A]boriginal
title which is sui generis and distinguishes it from normal property interests. 
In response to our argument that viewing the nation as rights-holder is more 
consistent with the purpose of section 35 to provide cultural security and 
continuity, the Court of Appeal does suggest that in some cases this may be 
possible but that the Court has yet to recognize this: 100 
97. See Bernard NBCA, supra note 2 at para 33. 
98. Ibid at para 50, discussing R v Marshall; R v Bernard 2005 SCC 43. 
99. Ibid at para 52 [emphasis in original]. 
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In some cases, it may well be that evidence will show an entire tribe/nation is entitled 
to exercise certain Aboriginal rights that are distinctive to their culture in all of the 
territory the tribe/nation occupied pre-contact, but that is not what the Supreme 
Court has held to date. 
However, no further guidance is given as to when such circumstances could 
materialize, but this concession seems entirely inconsistent with the tenor 
of the rest of the decision, at least when it comes to hunting, fshing, and 
harvesting rights. 
Te Court of Appeal ends its decision by citing deference to fndings of fact 
on the social organization of the Mìgmaq people, which it stresses were not 
challenged on the appeal:101 
[T]he evidence accepted by the trial judge, to whom deference is owed regarding his 
assessment of either fact or credibility, was that the Mi’kmaq historically organized 
themselves as separate bands each with their own traditional hunting territories. 
While there was a common culture and social bonds amongst these individual 
communities, each community had its own chief, and the communities governed 
themselves independently. … No evidence was presented at trial that would 
allow one to conclude that a modern-day Nation has become the contemporary 
community entitled to exercise all rights that had historically been exercised by local 
communities. While it may be that, in some cases, the evidence might reveal that 
certain communal rights belong to a tribe or nation, it was simply not the case in 
the matter under appeal. 
In this fnal passage, the Court of Appeal seems to suggest that our failure was in 
not challenging the trial judge’s fnding of fact that Mìgmaq historically organized 
themselves as separate bands according to Doctor Patterson’s evidence. Te Court 
of Appeal plays the question of “who is the rights-holder?” both ways here. For 
most of the decision, it appears to accept that this is a question of law alone (small 
geographic community versus nation), but in the end, switches gears to suggest 
that this is a question of the evidence. Although we maintained this fnding was 
wrong in fact, our position before the court was clear: Te question of “who is 
the rights-holder?” is a question of law alone. Te answer to the question is that 
it is the nation or people, and this is to be based on perspectives of the group in 
question. On any subsequent questions such as “who is a member of the nation?” 
and “who can exercise rights belonging to the nation?” we argued that such are 
matters to be left to the nation and not the courts. In oral submission before 
the court, we stressed such an approach was consistent with Article 9 of the 
United Nations Declarations of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states that 
101. Ibid at paras 56, 62. 












“Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an [I]ndigenous 
community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the 
community or nation concerned.”102 Te article suggests that who is part of the 
nation is a matter for the nation alone. 
VI. OUR DECISION NOT TO SEEK LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
Although we felt there were numerous errors in the reasons, several considerations 
informed our decision not to appeal to the SCC. One, of course, was the matter 
of costs—a SCC appeal would involve agent and fling fees, as well as travel fees 
to Ottawa that Mr. Bernard could not aford. Second, if the Court did not want 
to engage with our substantive arguments, particularly those on the Mìgmaq 
right to manage hunting rights (I believe this is truly a legal issue more than 
a factual one), we felt that the Court might cite gaps in the evidentiary record 
as an easy excuse not to engage with such arguments (as we saw the Court of 
Appeal do). In this regard, the fact that the Mìgmaq of New Brunswick had yet 
to exercise the right to regulate Mìgmaq hunting may have been a disincentive 
for the Court to engage with this argument, as some judges may feel that fnding 
such a governance right in a legal vacuum might invite the foodgates concern 
that seemed to have preoccupied the trial judge. We also thought it was probably 
better to be stuck with a bad (i.e., poorly reasoned) Court of Appeal decision over 
a bad SCC decision. 
Moreover, we saw a way to use the Court of Appeal’s fnding—that the 
local community had the power to regulate hunting rights—for the beneft of 
the larger Mìgmaq nation.103 Te holding in Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd
established that rights-holders may authorize an individual or an organization to 
represent them for the purpose of asserting their section 35 rights.104 With this 
decision, it seemed to us that if the larger political organization of Mìgmaq in 
New Brunswick (currently made up of the Chiefs of each First Nation) wanted 
to regulate Mìgmaq hunting rights, the authority could be delegated to it by 
each local band or First Nation. It could also develop rules and processes to 
decide who can hunt and where within the Mìgmaq territory in New Brunswick, 
including Mr. Bernard. 
102. UNDRIP, supra note 12, art 9. 
103. See Bernard NBCA, supra note 2 at para 58. 
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VII.CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON THE CASE 
Leading up to the Court of Appeal hearing and even after making submissions 
in this case, I was confdent that our argument for the right of the Mìgmaq 
people in the province to manage their own hunting rights had a reasonable 
chance of success. To me, this was a much neater and simpler approach to the 
question of whether the Mìgmaq people living in Saint John can hunt, compared 
to the analytical gymnastics the lower courts engaged in to come to their result. 
Te argument was for moving the law incrementally; it was not advancing a 
full-blown argument for self-government, but rather was proposing a modest 
expansion of the law in line with the incidental rights theory and what the Court 
had already said about the nature of communal rights. 
While the Court of Appeal did accept that Mìgmaq can regulate their 
hunting rights, they limited this right to the “local community.” I believe the 
Court of Appeal only had modern Indian Act reserve communities in mind, and 
not other communities. It is doubtful that they considered local communities 
of Mìgmaq living in urban centres; otherwise, they might have considered Mr. 
Bernard and his large extended family (who had been in Saint John for four 
generations) as a “local community.” 
Te Court of Appeal adopted a very narrow understanding of “community” 
as a small, geographic community. However, the word “community” in fact bears 
several meanings, as can be seen from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defnition, 
which ascribes eight separate meanings to the term, of which sub-clause (d) aptly 
describes the Mìgmaq as “a body of persons or nations having a common history 
or common social, economic and political interest.”105 It is also clear that the 
Court of Appeal took it to be obvious that the SCC in Van der Peet intended 
“community” and “particular Aboriginal group” to also mean a small, geographic 
community. However, there is room to doubt this, especially when the Court 
used the word “community” and “Aboriginal group” interchangeably within the 
decision with words like “peoples,” “tribes,” and “nations” (as it has done so in 
several other Aboriginal rights cases as reviewed above).106 
105. Merriam-Webster, “Defnition of Community,” online: <www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/community>. 
106. See Van der Peet, supra note 5 at paras 2, 76, 80, 84-89; see also Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal 
Rights and Indigenous Governance: Identifying the Holders of Rights and Authority” (2020) 
57 Osgoode Hall LJ. 









While it is true that the Court signalled in Van der Peet, especially at paragraph 
69, that Aboriginal rights cannot exist on a general basis,107 it does not follow 
from this that every single and separate geographical Aboriginal community in 
Canada would have to prove the same Aboriginal right, such as the right to 
hunt. Consider this in light of the fact there are over six hundred and thirty First 
Nations communities throughout Canada.108 Te Court of Appeal’s approach 
would require six hundred and thirty court actions to permit each First Nation 
community to hunt for food alone.109 Such an approach seems unnecessary and 
excessive when one appreciates that those six hundred and thirty First Nations 
belong to one of about ffty distinct Aboriginal nations.110 Each of these nations 
has their own distinct language, culture, and social-political structure. Terefore, 
the communities belonging to each nation would share the same distinctive and 
integral practices, customs, and traditions of the nation’s culture that the Van 
der Peet test aims to protect. Tat being the case, why would section 35 require 
sub-groups of smaller communities from the same nation or culture to individually 
prove the elements of Van der Peet in a lengthy and expensive court battle? How 
would that achieve the stated purpose of section 35 to reconcile asserted Crown 
sovereignty with the pre-existence of Aboriginal peoples on these lands? 
How did the judges miss this? My colleagues, Paul Chartrand and Gordon 
Christie, have advanced broader institutional arguments about how courts are 
not suited to make decisions on who the Aboriginal rights-holders are, because 
this should be left to government-to-government relations, or because judges are 
too entrenched in liberal ideology to seriously entertain questions of Indigenous 
self-determination.111 Either may well be the case, but I search (perhaps in vain) 
for more immediate reasons. 
One possible reason is that the Aboriginal rights test—including how it 
interacts with the treaty rights, Aboriginal title, and Métis rights tests—is overly 
107. For a thoughtful and nuanced consideration on the case law on this issue, see Brian Slattery, 
“Te Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights” in John D Whyte, ed, Moving Toward 
Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Purich, 2008) 20. 
108. Government of Canada, “First Nations” (4 December 2017), online: Crown-Indigenous 
Relations and Northern Afairs Canada <https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/110010001379 
1/1535470872302> [First Nations]. 
109. Tis example does not even factor in other communities, like the Inuit, Métis, of-reserve, 
or non-status communities. 
110. First Nations, supra note 102. 
111. Paul Chartrand, “Rethinking the Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights: Te Métis Cases” (2020) 
57 Osgoode Hall LJ 173; Gordon Christie, “Potential Aboriginal Rights-holders: Canada 
and Cultural Communities Versus Indigenous Peoples and Socio-Political Bodies” (2020) 57 
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complex and confusing, especially for judges who likely did not study this area in 
law school or practice in this area. In this regard, the site-specifcity requirement 
seemed particularly challenging for the judges hearing Mr. Bernard’s case to 
apply. Te judges could not accept that it would be sufcient for Mìgmaq to 
have previously frequented the site prior to contact, as this is clearly all that 
is required from Van der Peet, Côté, and Adams, as discussed above.112 Instead, 
the judges hearing Mr. Bernard’s case essentially added a requirement to prove 
that Mìgmaq had been continuously and currently using the site through CCR
(a requirement that looks remarkably like the test for the Aboriginal title). Perhaps 
the Euro-Canadian, common-law-trained brain is hard-wired to recognize 
more sedentary or agricultural land-use patterns and is challenged to recognize 
otherwise? While the Court has repeatedly cautioned against falling into such 
traps, this is a mistake that lower courts continue to make.113 How could the 
Court of Appeal not realize it was making such a mistake, despite the several 
passages from the Court we referred them to? 
In examining the lower courts’ and Court of Appeal’s decisions in this case, 
it becomes evident that all the judges were resistant to seriously engaging with the 
idea that the Mìgmaq nation could be the rights-holders. Tis proposition was 
dismissed out of hand by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal read an unduly 
narrow concept of “community” into SCC jurisprudence to avoid dealing with 
this submission. Instead, we get the fctitious “Saint John Mìgmaq community or 
nation” as the rights-holders and implicit acceptance of the “lack of a Superchief” 
theory. By this, the Court of Appeal engaged in just as much, if not more, legal 
gymnastics than the trial judge in order to side-step this issue, particularly when 
the lower court’s errors were squarely raised before them. 
Why were the judges so unwilling to seriously engage with the idea that the 
Mìgmaq nation was the rights-holder? Although the Court of Appeal explicitly 
disagreed with me on this, I think Mr. Bernard lost in the end, because of 
foodgate concerns. I am convinced that there was an underlying fear among 
the judges in this case, perhaps not even fully consciously realized, that a fnding 
for Mr. Bernard would mean a result where any Mìgmaq person—from Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, and Gaspé 
to Maine—could go hunt in Saint John and anywhere else in Mìgmàgi (the 
112. Based on the Aboriginal rights test, the relevant time period is pre-contact use. It has been 
found that Mìgmaq are precluded from claiming rights over territories they used only after 
contact. See Queen v Drew, 2003 NLSCTD 105 at para 615. 
113. See e.g. Karen Drake, “R v Hirsekorn: Are Métis Rights a Constitutional Myth?” (2013) 92 
Can Bar Rev 149. 
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land of the Mìgmaq). I have already set out the numerous reasons why such a 
concern is unwarranted. I will only conclude by saying that the Mìgmaq nation 
is a reasonable and is of reasoning people, who ought to be given the space to 
conscientiously manage their hunting rights. By failing to have the courage to 
make this space, the law in New Brunswick now regressively ties the exercise of 
Aboriginal rights to Indian Act reserves, and imposes the onerous requirement 
that each band must individually prove their Aboriginal rights. Tis efectively 
deprives those Mìgmaq people like Mr. Bernard who are living of-reserve, but 
still within Mìgmàgi, the ability to exercise site-specifc Aboriginal rights. 
